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Abstract 
This study discusses how and whether paradox management practices spill over between or-
ganizations along a global value chain. Based on case study evidence related to a global value 
chain from the footwear industry between Germany and China, we study how different actors 
coped with the paradoxical tension between providing living wages to workers and upholding 
financial performance. Our findings show: (a) that the German national business system created 
an institutional context in which the living wage paradox was evaluated in a proactive manner, 
while the Chinese national business system favored a defensive response and (b) that Chinese 
organizations framed a proposed paradox management practice (living wage audits) in a way 
that it lost its intended meaning. Based on this, we theorize a sensemaking model, which high-
lights that relevant sensemaking activities in the Chinese context were impeded and therefore 
did not reinforce the proactive framing of the paradox management practice.  
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INTRODUCTION 
"From one side, the client asks us to reduce the working time and 
increase the wages. But from the other side, they push the delivery 
and the prices like hell. So this is conflictive."  
--- Chinese manufacturer  
 
Increasingly complex environments and global competition expose organizations to more par-
adoxical tensions today than a few decades ago. Paradoxes are defined as two conflicting goals 
that exist simultaneously; these goals contradict each other, but are yet “two sides of the same 
coin” (Lewis, 2000, p. 761) as they are interrelated and co-exist over time (Jarzabkowski, Lê, 
& van de Ven, 2013). The literature agrees that organizations cope with paradoxical tensions 
through proactive or defensive paradox management practices, which are actions they take in 
order to construct and respond to contradictions (Jarzabkowski & Lê, 2017; Lewis, 2000).  
Surprisingly little research has been done on how paradox management takes place in inter-
organizational contexts. While the literature has looked at how firms handle inter-organizational 
paradox as part of coopetition or cross-sector partnerships (see, e.g. Sharma & Bansal, 2017; 
Stadtler, 2018; Stadtler & van Wassenhove, 2016), it has not analyzed how paradox manage-
ment practices spill over (i.e. spread) from one organization to another. Yet, analyzing paradox 
management in inter-organizational contexts matters, because through outsourcing and division 
of labor along global value chains organizations are connected to an increasing number of busi-
ness partners. Together with these partners, they face paradoxes, which are often present in 
entire industries and global value chains. Therefore, organizations that collaborate along a value 
chain have to find joint solutions for paradox management. As Schad et al. (2016) argue, there 
is a need to explore the relationships among actors in organizational paradox management. 
Prior research has emphasized that interpretative context (Knight & Paroutis, 2017), and espe-
cially cultural context (Keller, Loewenstein, & Yan, 2017; Prashantham & Eranova, 2018), 
influence how organizations make sense of paradox and hence their paradox management prac-
tices. Paradox management that is effective and established in one organization in a certain 
context is not necessarily effective for another organization in a different context. We are hence 
interested in how organizations, which collaborate in a joint global value chain and are con-
fronted with the same paradox, but operate in different institutional contexts, interact in their 
ways of paradox handling and contextual sensemaking activities. We draw on the concept of 
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“national business systems” (NBS) (Maurice, M., & Sorge, A., 2000; Sorge, 1991; Whitley, 
1992, 1999) to illustrate differences in institutional context. Our paper thus aims to answer the 
following research questions: How does a country’s national business system affect organiza-
tions’ responses to paradoxical demands? How do these responses affect the inter-organiza-
tional spillover of paradox management practices along global value chains?  
We build on a qualitative single case study (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 2014) of one global value 
chain related to the footwear industry (stretching from Germany to China). The empirical con-
text of our study links to corporate social responsibility (CSR), which often confronts organi-
zations with paradoxical tensions (Bondy, 2008; Colle, Henriques, & Sarasvathy, 2014). We 
analyze how organizations within the footwear value chain handle the paradoxical demand to 
implement living wages for workers while at the same time reducing unit prices. This demand 
is paradoxical to the organizations, as it requires simultaneously meeting goals related to social 
justice and financial performance. Our comprehensive data set includes 99 formal and informal 
interviews with individuals from seven organizations in the global value chain and their stake-
holders as well as 188 hours of observation.  
We find that along the global value chain, all organizations were confronted with the paradox-
ical demand to implement living wages. They all addressed the paradox by implementing living 
wage audits through the Business Social Compliance Initiative (BSCI). Yet, German and Chi-
nese organizations interpreted paradox management through BSCI audits in different ways: The 
German retailer and the import agent coped with the paradox in a proactive manner by con-
fronting, accepting, and adjusting the conflicting goals. They instructed their CSR departments 
to implement measures to increase workers’ wages and defined audit processes as a precondi-
tion for economic transactions with their suppliers. The Chinese manufacturers and material 
suppliers handled the paradox in a defensive way; they suppressed, repressed, and split the 
conflicting goals. Instead of adjusting working hours and wages, they forged the audit data. We 
argue that differences in the relevant NBS, among other things, can explain these diverging 
responses. Our data shows that even though the retailer (a powerful global buyer) managed to 
push down the BSCI audit standard to the other organizations in the chain, they did not manage 
to pass on how the audits were framed as a paradox-handling practice. Despite the proactive 
paradox responses of the German organizations, the BSCI audits were framed in a defensive 
way by the Chinese manufacturers. 
4 
 
Our findings contribute to two streams of literature: First, we contribute to the paradox literature 
by showing how different NBS create conditions, which influence the way organizations make 
sense of paradox management practices (Keller et al., 2017; Prashantham & Eranova, 2018; 
Xiao, Wilhelm, van der Vaart, & van Donk, 2019). Whether or not proactive paradox manage-
ment practices are successfully pushed down a global value chain, depends on organizational 
sensemaking activities that are, in turn, influenced by the interpretative frames embedded in the 
respective NBS. We draw together our findings in a sensemaking model, which theorizes the 
relationship between inter-organizational responses to paradox management and the sensemak-
ing activities that take place when paradox management is interpreted based on the repertoire 
of frames provided by a NBS. Second, we contribute to the literature on CSR as paradox (Hahn, 
Figge, Pinkse, & Preuss, 2018; Hahn, Preuss, Pinkse, & Figge, 2014; Ivory & Brooks, 2018; 
Sharma & Jaiswal, 2018) by displaying how organizations handle living wage implementation 
in their value chains. We indicate that for some social issues in global value chains, such as 
wages and working hours, auditing as a social compliance instrument reflects a rather ineffec-
tive paradox management strategy. When confronting suppliers from different institutional con-
texts with paradoxical CSR demands, buyers need to move beyond simply dictating audit 
schemes to their suppliers. We emphasize the need to embed auditing schemes (like the BSCI) 
into collaborative management practices that provide “occasions” (Weick, 1995) to create a 
shared understanding of the root causes of the paradoxical demands. We suggest that such an 
understanding of root causes can help to infuse proactive paradox management throughout the 
entire value chain.  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: After a review of the literature (section 
two), we describe our methods of data collection and analysis (section three). We then introduce 
our findings (section four) and draw on the sensemaking literature to explain our results in the 
discussion section and outline our contributions to the existing literature on paradox and CSR 
(section five). The final section concludes the paper (section six).  
LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
Paradox management 
While in the past the term ‘paradox’ has been used to describe various circumstances (Briscoe, 
2016; Lewis, 2000, p. 761), by now it is commonly defined as “contradictory yet interrelated 
elements that exist simultaneously and persist over time” (Smith & Lewis, 2011, p. 382). This 
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definition distinguishes paradoxes from other dialectics, dilemmas, or choices, where the con-
tradictory elements are not dependent on one another or tensions that are only short-lived (Har-
grave & van de Ven, 2017; Lewis, 2000). The literature has looked at how organizations handle 
paradox, distinguishing between defensive and proactive response strategies. Defensive para-
dox response leads to reinforcing cycles and reproduction of paradoxical tensions (Lewis, 2000, 
p. 762). It refers to practices such as: (a) splitting, where the two contradictory elements are 
separated either temporally or spatially; (b) repressing, which refers to denial of the entire par-
adox; or (c) suppressing, where one side of the paradox is ignored in favor of the other (Jarzab-
kowski & Lê, 2017; Lewis, 2000). Proactive paradox response does not remove or resolve a 
paradox, but embraces it in a more effective manner (Lewis, 2000). It includes practices such 
as: (a) accepting, which refers to an understanding of the contradictions as a natural condition 
of work; (b) confronting, where contradictory elements are critically discussed; or (c) adjusting, 
where organizations accept both contradictory elements as equally important and mutually de-
pendent (Jarzabkowski et al., 2013; Lewis, 2000). 
Paradoxes exist on various levels (Smith, 2014): the micro level, where the individual experi-
ence of paradox and a single person’s coping behavior is the research focus (Jarzabkowski 
& Lê, 2017); the meso level, where the intra-organizational boundaries of firms contain the 
paradoxical tensions (Jarzabkowski et al., 2013); and the macro level, where various firms at 
once are confronted with inter-organizational contradictory demands (e.g., entire value chains; 
Xiao et al., 2019). The literature has predominantly looked at paradox on a micro level (see, 
e.g. Calabretta, Gemser, & Wijnberg, 2017; Cuganesan, 2017; Jarzabkowski & Lê, 2017; 
Miron-Spektor, Ingram, Keller, Smith, & Lewis, 2018; Smith, 2014), on a meso level (see, e.g. 
Jay, 2013; Knight & Paroutis, 2017; Sheep, Fairhurst, & Khazanchi, 2017), and at how micro 
and meso levels interrelate (see, e.g. Abdallah, Denis, & Langley, 2011; Jarzabkowski et al., 
2013). Yet, there has been remarkably little macro level research on how inter-organizational 
management of paradox takes place. While scholars have studied how organizations jointly 
manage paradox within cross-sector partnerships (Sharma & Bansal, 2017; Stadtler, 2018; 
Stadtler & van Wassenhove, 2016), research has scarcely examined whether and how paradox 
management practices spill over from one organization to another as part of collaboration agree-
ments in global value chains. This is surprising as the globalization of value chains increasingly 
confronts organizations with contradictory demands and the different institutional contexts in-
fluence how paradoxes are addressed. Institutional contexts come with different political, fi-
nancial, labor, and cultural systems (Whitley, 1992, 1999), which influence how organizations 
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cope with paradox (Keller et al., 2017; Prashantham & Eranova, 2018; Putnam, Fairhurst, & 
Banghart, 2016; Schad et al., 2016). Therefore, it is interesting to look at paradoxes on a macro 
level and analyze how organizations, which are confronted with the same paradox, but operate 
in different institutional contexts, influence each other in terms of their paradox management. 
When looking at business conduct in different institutional contexts, sensemaking activities 
play a role. Sensemaking refers to the process of giving meaning to one’s experiences through 
one’s interpretative schemata (“sensemaking frames”) (Weick, 1995). Recently, some scholars 
have analyzed paradox from a sensemaking perspective, because it gives insight on both cog-
nition and action involved in paradox management (Hahn et al., 2014; Hargrave & van de Ven, 
2017; Jay, 2013; Lüscher & Lewis, 2008; Sharma & Bansal, 2017). However, few studies have 
looked at how such sensemaking of paradoxes takes place across different institutional contexts 
(see, e.g., Knight & Paroutis, 2017; Osland & Bird, 2000), and no study, to our knowledge, has 
explored whether and how sensemaking activities impact the inter-organizational handling of 
paradox management. Our study looks into this conundrum by exploring in how far the institu-
tional context influences sensemaking frames that are used by different organizations during 
paradox management.  
Paradoxes in CSR 
CSR inherently confronts organizations with tensions because it sets non-economic (social and 
environmental) objectives (Hahn et al., 2014), which often contradict traditional financial goals. 
Therefore, CSR constitutes a paradox of performing (Smith & Lewis, 2011, p. 383), which re-
lates to the plurality of stakeholder interests and their competing strategies and goals (Smith, 
2014). Looking at CSR through the paradox lens enables “a better understanding of managerial 
decision making regarding ambiguous sustainability issues“ (Hahn et al., 2014, p. 463). There-
fore, some authors have used the paradox lens as a cognitive frame in order to analyze and 
comprehend CSR managers’ thinking (see, e.g. Hahn et al., 2014; Sharma & Jaiswal, 2018), 
their identities (Carollo & Guerci, 2018), or to examine particular defensive paradox responses 
(Iivonen, 2018). Scholars have recommended that by applying practices of ambidexterity and 
paradox management, organizations can achieve higher corporate social performance (Hahn, 
Pinkse, Preuss, & Figge, 2016), develop strategic agility, (Ivory & Brooks, 2018), and better 
preserve their legitimacy in heterogeneous environments (Scherer, Palazzo, & Seidl, 2013). 
However, when confronted with CSR issues, organizations often collaborate as part of multi-
stakeholder initiatives (MSIs) with their competitors, suppliers, and business partners along 
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global value chains (Mena & Palazzo, 2012; Sloan & Oliver, 2013). The literature recently 
started to take interest in paradox management of single (hybrid) organizations in global value 
chains (Kannothra, Manning, & Haigh, 2018). Nevertheless, it has not yet looked at how and 
whether business partners along global value chains interact in order to jointly solve CSR par-
adoxes or how inter-organizational spillover of paradox management practices takes place. 
National Business Systems 
Global value chains connect organizations with business partners from different institutional 
contexts. The literature has shown that institutional context largely influences the way an or-
ganization handles paradox (Keller et al., 2017; Knight & Paroutis, 2017), and therefore it is 
inevitable to consider the role of contextual variables when studying how organizations along 
global value chains jointly face paradox. We conceptualize institutional context through the 
notion of NBS as it theorizes durable characteristics of institutional context (Matten & Moon, 
2008). The concept of business systems is a widely accepted approach to describe different 
types of business conduct and governance (see, e.g., Haake, 2002; Hotho, 2014; Saka, 2004). 
Business systems can be defined as dominant patterns of “economic organization and control” 
(Whitley, 1999, p. 15). The concept of NBS, as introduced by Whitley (1992, 1999), recognizes 
that economic organization and control interacts with institutional context. NBS offers a lens to 
the variety of national institutional frameworks organizations operate in and the effects these 
frameworks have on organizations (Hotho, 2014). The NBS approach considers that over the 
course of the last century different forms of capitalism have emerged in different institutional 
contexts (hence its parallels with the ‘varieties of capitalism’ literature (Hall & Soskice, 2013)).  
The NBS literature suggests that institutional context is composed of four different sub-systems 
(Whitley, 1992, 1999): (1) the political system refers to the power of the state in an institutional 
context; it describes how willing and capable the state is to share risks with private companies 
and to which extent it interferes in social and economic activity through regulation; (2) the 
financial system points to the major financial sources for business organizations, which can be 
the stock market, investors, or tax money in case of state-owned firms; (3) the skill development 
and labor system describes how human resources are developed and regulated; it points to the 
post-secondary school system of a country and the way the labor market is governed, i.e. 
through employment law or trade unions (Whitley, 1999); finally (4) the cultural system refers 
to culturally shaped norms, values, and assumptions about society, business, and government 
in a NBS; it determines collective identities of the workforce that are prevalent in a country and 
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their degree of trust in authorities and it is largely affected by the reliability of public institutions 
in a NBS. 
The two institutional contexts, which are relevant to this paper, can be characterized as follows 
(see table 1): The German NBS comes with (1) a political system of a social market economy 
with moderate state power, where the state, like in many continental European countries, inter-
feres in economic activities (Matten & Moon, 2008). The (2) German financial system relies 
mostly on a number of large investors (Matten & Moon, 2008; Silvia, 2013); the two German 
companies discussed in this paper also rely on such large investors. The (3) skill development 
and labor system rests on pillars of strong public education as well as robust national trade 
unions and civil society (Lane, 1997). The (4) cultural system is defined by high trust in public 
institutions and norms and values related to strong work and business ethics (Lane, 1997). 
The Chinese NBS is characterized by (1) a political system of authoritarian capitalism (Witt & 
Redding, 2013), where the Communist Party of China (CPC) is powerful (Hofman, Moon, & 
Wu, 2017). The (2) financial system is split: for firms that are party-owned, state-owned banks 
offer financial resources; for privately-owned companies, financial access is a lot harder (Hof-
man et al., 2017; Witt & Redding, 2014). Most Chinese suppliers that are part of global textile 
and footwear value chains are part of the private sector, including the five Chinese firms dis-
cussed in this paper. The (3) skill development and labor system rests on a relatively weak 
education system (Witt & Redding, 2014), which leads to shortage of skill development (Witt 
& Redding, 2014). There is one party-owned trade union, the All-Chinese Federation of Trade 
Unions (ACFTU), which mainly represents interests of the CPC (Hofman et al., 2017). The (4) 
cultural system is defined by low trust in authorities, which supports the institutionalization of 
corruption (Whitley, 1999, p. 52; Witt & Redding, 2014). Chinese norms and values lead to a 
positive attitude towards work (Witt & Redding, 2014). 
========================== 
Insert table 1 about here 
========================== 
METHOD AND CASE SETTING 
A case study research design enables us to conduct an in-depth analysis of complex settings 
(Yin, 2014). The global footwear industry offers a suitable research context as it was recently 
confronted with the living wage paradox (similar to the textile industry (Egels-Zandén, 2017)). 
For the brands and retailers in the industry, the NGO pressure to implement living wages is a 
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performance paradox (Smith & Lewis, 2011), as it collides with their established goal to mini-
mize unit prices. We selected the living wage paradox as a case because it is a paradox that 
confronts several organizations at once. It requires inter-organizational solution finding and, 
ideally, a spillover of paradox handling practices between organizations despite their geograph-
ical distance and different institutional contexts. 
Research context 
The initial part of our data collection was conducted in Germany with two organizations, which 
form the first two stages of the global value chain. The retailer (in this paper referred to as 
Retail Group) looks back to a long-standing tradition as one of Germany’s leading retail com-
panies. Ever since the 1980s, Retail Group has sourced products from oversea factories. In the 
1990s, they established a CSR department and started addressing social and environmental con-
ditions in their value chains. We also analyzed an importing firm (in this paper referred to as 
Shoe Import) with offices in both Germany and China. Shoe Import is mainly specialized on 
trading footwear products. Ever since the early 1990s, they import shoes from countries like 
India, Vietnam, and China, with China being their biggest producing market.  
Retail Group, in early 2015, and Shoe Import, in 2016, lifted the topic of living wages onto their 
CSR agendas. A living wage is a wage that secures an adequate living standard for workers and 
their families above the poverty line. In contrast to a legal minimum wage, it is not the result of 
industry collective bargaining or legislation, but is set from a certain threshold of quality of life  
(Carr, Parker, Arrowsmith, & Watters, 2015; Shelburne, 1999). To Retail Group and Shoe Im-
port the ambition to implement living wages was paradoxical as it was against their established 
purchasing practices, which set financial performance and low unit prices as the highest objec-
tive. Both Retail Group and Shoe Import manage issues of social responsibility in their global 
value chains through the Business Social Compliance Initiative (BSCI), which is a social audit-
ing initiative. BSCI members are obliged to pay at least the local legal minimum wage to work-
ers in their value chains and comply with local maximum working hours. However, the BSCI 
can also be used as a tool to push the responsibility for living wages down the value chain (see 
below). Complying with the BSCI can therefore help organizations to cope with the living wage 
paradox, if relevant organizational actors interpret the BSCI as a way to accept both living 
wages and financial performance as equally important and mutually dependent.  
The other part of our research took place in China, where we collected data with another five 
organizations along the value chain. Our journey along the global value chain first led us to the 
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Chinese office of Shoe Import in the province Guangdong, which was opened in the early 2000s 
and employs both German and Chinese staff. We then moved to the Fujian province, where we 
collected data with three manufacturers. All three manufacturers have had long-term business 
relations with Shoe Import. Finally, we conducted research with two material suppliers, which 
are also situated in the Fujian province. Similar to the manufacturers, both material suppliers 
are private family businesses. While we are aware that our sample footwear value chain extends 
to more suppliers, dyers, and producers of raw materials, we stopped our data collection in the 
second tier of the value chain. We did this mainly for reasons of good access, which is crucial 
when analyzing a research topic, where paradoxical tensions play a role (Feldman, Bell, & 
Berger, 2003). To Chinese manufacturers and material suppliers, the demand to pay living was 
paradoxical, as it required raising labor costs while simultaneously decreasing prices.  
Data collection 
We draw on three types of data sources: interviews, observations, and archival data. Tables 2 
and 3 give an overview of our data set.  
========================== 
Insert tables 2 and 3 about here 
========================== 
 
Interviews. In total, we conducted 47 formal (semi-structured interviews, see Appendix 1 for 
an example of our interview guide) and 52 informal interviews with individuals in and around 
the value chain between 2015 and 2018, which helped us to understand the paradox and the 
organizations’ paradox responses. We audio recorded and transcribed all formal interviews, 
resulting in 235 pages of transcript. Interviews were conducted in English, German, and Man-
darin (with the help of an interpreter). Those parts of the interviews that we used as direct quotes 
in the paper were translated to English. We captured informal interviews through field notes 
(for anonymization used in the data see Appendix 2). In total, our data set includes approxi-
mately 61.5 hours of interviews. Data collection started in 2015, when we conducted a series 
of formal interviews with Retail Group’s CSR managers, who had just been confronted with 
the living wage paradox. In order to learn more about paradox management mechanisms within 
and between organizations, i.e. actual living wage implementation, we asked Retail Group to 
connect us with their suppliers along one value chain in 2016. As getting access to suppliers 
was not easy, it took us until 2017 to lead our first interviews with employees of Shoe Import 
and schedule factory visits in China. While we had sampled the textile and footwear industry 
theoretically, because it had recently been confronted with the living wage paradox, the focus 
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on the Chinese footwear industry was determined by Shoe Import’s willingness to provide us 
access to their business partners.  
Interviewees included representatives of Retail Group’s CSR (n = 7) and buying departments 
(n = 3) (in Germany), Shoe Import’s CSR (n = 4) and buying departments (n = 8) (in Germany 
and China), factory managers (n = 6) and workers (n = 14) of manufacturers and material sup-
pliers (in Fujian province, China), other employees of the organizations in the chain (n = 6), 
and stakeholders (n = 23) (see table 3). While most of our interviews in Germany were formally 
audio recorded and transcribed, many of the interviews in China had an informal character and 
could not be recorded for two reasons: First, not recording helped to get interviewees to speak 
more freely (mostly the case for factory managers and workers). Second, recording was not 
possible because we conducted interviews in informal and loud settings. For instance, most 
worker interviews were conducted next to the production lines in order for workers to still be 
able to meet their piece rate objectives for the day. In addition, many interviews with Shoe 
Import’s Chinese staff and some of the traders and factory managers took place during business 
lunches and dinners or during car rides, where they resembled more informal conversations 
than formal interviews. In addition to our interviews with professionals along the value chain, 
stakeholder interviews completed the data set (see table 2). These stakeholder interviews mainly 
fulfilled the purpose to triangulate our findings and understand the German and Chinese insti-
tutional contexts. 
Non-participant observations. We visited Retail Group and Shoe Import on several occasions 
between 2015 and 2018 observing informal and formal meetings and events, however without 
actively participating in these activities. Moreover, we spent five weeks in March and April 
2018 in Hong Kong and China conducting stakeholder interviews, visiting the Chinese office 
of Shoe Import, and accompanying representatives of Shoe Import’s CSR department on rou-
tine factory visits as silent observers. Through these observations, we were able to learn more 
about the contradictory tensions the managers were facing and to first-hand observe everyday 
responses to the living wage paradox. In total, this resulted in 188 hours of direct observation 
captured in field notes.   
Archival data. Retail Group and Shoe Import provided 47 mostly non-public documents for 
analysis such as PowerPoint slides, meeting minutes, and reports, which helped to build our 
background understanding of the two organizations and the relevant institutional context. In 
order to comprehend the context of the footwear industry between Germany and China and the 
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overall living wage issue, we drew on an additional 38 documents, some of which were publicly 
accessible and some of which were provided by different stakeholders (e.g., NGOs and inter-
national organizations).  
Data analysis 
The data was analyzed using an open-ended theory-building approach, which started during 
data collection and took several iterative cycles (Corbin & Strauss, 2015; Gioia, Corley, & 
Hamilton, 2013). We went through a four-step process of data analysis (see figure 1): 
========================== 
Insert figure 1 about here 
========================== 
 
 
Step 1 – Identification of paradox. In 2015, we led 11 interviews with CSR managers of Retail 
Group and their stakeholders and learned about the demand to implement living wages in their 
global value chains. After a first round of inductive analysis and a literature review, we identi-
fied this demand as particularly interesting, because it seemed inherently paradoxical to the 
actors.  
Step 2 – Open coding. We got access to the value chain and collected more data. Our data 
included multiple units (i.e. organizations in the value chain) and levels of analysis (i.e. intra- 
vs. inter-organizational paradox management), with blurring boundaries (Langley, 1999). We 
coded data for each organization in the value chain separately. Using MAXQDA, we created 
an integrated database of all data and assigned 308 mass descriptive open codes (Strauss & 
Corbin, 1998). Three themes emerged during this phase of analysis: First, the nature of the 
living wage paradox unfolded as a particularly interesting inter-organizational paradox that 
confronted all organizations along the value chain and that demanded joint paradox handling. 
Second, the contrast between proactive and defensive paradox management by different organ-
izations along the chain became clear. Third, the spillover of paradox management stuck out as 
interesting. 
Step 3 – Axial coding. We started to analyze data across the different organizations in the value 
chain applying constant comparison (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). While the first two steps were 
rather inductive, we included more abductive elements in this step by linking our data to the 
paradox literature (Mantere & Ketokivi, 2013). We identified different proactive and defensive 
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paradox management practices, singling out adjusting, confronting, and accepting (i.e. proac-
tive practices) and suppressing, repressing, and splitting (i.e. defensive practices) (Jarzabkow-
ski & Lê, 2017; Lewis, 2000). We then allocated the organizations to two different contexts 
(Germany and China) and made references to the NBS literature (Whitley, 1992, 1999) to fur-
ther explain the phenomena we could see in the data. We assigned 57 axial codes (Strauss 
& Corbin, 1998) distinguishing between paradox management in the German and Chinese 
NBS. The comparison was further informed by additional informal interviews with CSR man-
agers of Retail Group and Shoe Import. 
Step 4 – Aggregation of data. In order to move from a large number of descriptive open and 
axial codes to a smaller number of more telling codes, we returned to the literature on paradox 
management, paradoxes in CSR, and NBS. We compared the descriptive codes with one an-
other and further contrasted them with the literature. This yielded 16 first-order codes (van 
Maanen, 1979) (see figure 2). Finally, we further grouped these first-order codes into 12 sec-
ond-order themes as well as three aggregate dimensions (see table 4). In order to explain our 
results and build them into a model, we drew on the sensemaking literature. 
========================== 
Insert figure 2 and table 4 about here 
========================== 
FINDINGS 
Our findings first describe how the German NBS created conditions that mostly enabled proac-
tive paradox responses (sub-section 1); while the Chinese NBS mostly fostered conditions for 
defensive paradox responses (sub-section 2). We then describe how the interpretation of the 
BSCI (the paradox management practice) differed across both NBS and which implications this 
had for the spillover of this practice along the value chain (sub-section 3). Figure 3 summarizes 
our findings.   
========================== 
Insert figure 3 about here 
========================== 
Proactive paradox responses in the German National Business System 
The institutional factors of the German NBS created conditions that influenced how Retail 
Group and Shoe Import made sense of and handled the living wage paradox. As part of the 
German political system, the state encouraged voluntary regulation of wages and working con-
ditions along global value chains. Particularly, the German Textile Alliance (a governmental 
14 
 
initiative) confronted Retail Group and Shoe Import with the living wage issue and encouraged 
them to put it on their CSR agendas. 
"So, that (attention to living wages) is changing rapidly through the German Textile Alliance, 
which has become very large. (…) as an element of our social management system, it (the living 
wage topic) came through the German Textile Alliance" (RetailGroup5). 
 
"We have to (…) position ourselves towards living wages in the German Textile Alliance in 
order to make a political statement" (Retail Group1_I14). 
 
The German Textile Alliance, which was founded by the German government and may even 
turn into a legal obligation in the future (RetailGroup1_I1), encouraged Retail Group and Shoe 
Import to embrace the payment of living wages as a precondition for doing business along 
global value chains. It was therefore easier for both organizations to handle the opposite poles 
of the living wage paradox – social justice vs. financial performance – with equal importance 
and in an integrated manner.  
Parts of the German financial system encouraged organizations to see responsible business con-
duct as a driver of competitive advantage. The financial market consists mostly of large inves-
tors (Matten & Moon, 2008), which demanded organizations to avoid reputational risks and 
plan long-term in order to get access to capital. Organizations, therefore, were motivated to be 
a responsible player by financial market actors. Retail Group’s CEO stated at the 2018 annual 
press conference for the financial report: "We want to become the ethically impeccable alter-
native to Amazon" (RetailGroup1_I15). Not much different, Shoe Import, in their 2017 sus-
tainability report, framed their social commitment as a driver of innovation and competitive 
advantage: 
"What sets us apart from the other players in the market, (…) is commitment (...) Over the last 
decade we worked hard to integrate social and environmental compliance in our traditional 
manufacturing practices and to come up with innovative ideas to advance sustainable materi-
als, production techniques and management approaches" (ShoeImport_Owner in 2017 sustain-
ability report). 
 
By framing responsibility in such a win-win way, it became easier for organizations in the Ger-
man NBS to handle the two opposite poles of the living wage paradox in an integrated manner.  
Paying living wages and achieving financial performance were not seen as mutually exclusive. 
Rather, both elements were adjusted in a way that they reinforce each other. 
The skill development and labor system in Germany comes with strong NGOs and trade unions 
(Lane, 1997) that put pressure on organizations to pay living wages: 
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"I believe the urgency with which NGOs are treating the topic (of living wages) made it inevi-
table that it also got on our agenda. I do not believe (…) we did a risk analysis or some sort of 
mapping and said ‘So, (…) where do we have to become more active?’, but I believe it comes 
from the multi-stakeholder initiatives, especially the German Textile Alliance (…). I believe that 
it (the topic of living wages) is a reoccurring question to which we do not have an answer and 
this (…) makes it very visible to us that we have to put it on the agenda" (Retail Group1_I1). 
 
NGOs confronted firms like Retail Group and Shoe Import with the living wage paradox, and 
this caused them to proactively deal with the underlying tensions. The non-payment of living 
wages was perceived to be related to significant reputational risks and a loss of financial ad-
vantage.  
The German cultural system comes with norms and values that encouraged proactive paradox 
management by emphasizing trust in authorities as well as strong work and business ethics 
(Lane, 1997). Individuals within organizations, especially CSR managers, conducted responsi-
ble business to meet their own ethical standards and current as well as future legal requirements 
(Retail Group1_I1). Managers therefore applied proactive paradox management practices, such 
as confronting and adjusting, by entering conflicts with other members of their organizations 
and by showing real commitment to integrating the opposite poles of the paradox and imple-
ment living wages despite the highly competitive industry they operate in: "I think we (my boss 
and I) don't understand each other. We cannot make political statements on the side. We have 
to make real changes" (Retail Group1_I14). 
Defensive paradox responses in the Chinese National Business System 
The Chinese NBS created conditions that encouraged organizations to adopt rather defensive 
responses to the living wage paradox. While the Chinese government launched strict wage leg-
islation that required high overtime payment, it did not enforce these laws:  
"In China, we have a labor law that says overtime should be limited to three hours a day. In a 
week, the total working hours should not be more than 60 hours. (…) This is Chinese labor law. 
But China is such a particular country; it is normal that an employer does not comply with the 
labor law. (…) Because we don't have such a strict (enforcement of) regulation" (ShoeIm-
port2_I2). 
 
Some aspects of the Chinese social security legislation were outdated in the sense that they 
were never adapted to the needs of migrant workers, which made up half of the workforce in 
the factories we visited (Manufacturer1). Hence, many Chinese workers did not have social 
security, but they had to afford health and pension costs from their own wages, which, strictly 
speaking, makes living wages even more desirable: 
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"If only after 15 years of living in a place and having to stay there, you get access to your 
pension, then naturally no migrant worker will make payments to such a pension fund. This is 
completely illogical. (…) I don't know, if you know these old Chinese laws, back from the com-
munist time, when everyone was tied to a certain place. You were not allowed to leave your 
province. (…) You grow up in one city, you stay there, you work there, and you die there. And 
this is not up to date anymore in China (…) but the legislation does not catch up. And this is 
the problem" (ShoeImport1_I2). 
This malfunctioning legislation caused Chinese organizations to suppress one side of the para-
dox. The manufacturers and material suppliers paid no attention to relevant legislation because 
it was clear that non-compliance would remain without consequences and that the CPC did not 
pressure firms to adopt multi-stakeholder solutions (as the German government did).  
The Chinese financial system also encouraged this defensive handling of the living wage para-
dox. The manufacturers and material suppliers in the value chain we studied are private firms, 
which cannot easily access bank loans in China (Witt & Redding, 2013). Also, in the Chinese 
financial system, there is no established system of insolvency proceedings, which reduced Chi-
nese organizations’ ability to take financial risks, because going bankrupt means “losing your 
face” (Manufacturer1) and “taking a lot of people with you” (ShoeImport1). In combination, 
these two effects made it hard for Chinese organizations to make long-term investments in 
worker trainings, which would enable an environment where living wages could be imple-
mented.  
"Nowadays, actually, a supplier or factory is never interested in doing this (investing in train-
ings for workers). But they also don't know how to, and they don't know how much money they 
need to invest. And then they don't know, if they will have benefits; they just don't know what 
are the final benefits that they can get, if they invest that much" (Manufacturer1). 
 
Consequently, the Chinese firms prioritized short-term financial goals and thus suppressed one 
side of the paradox. 
The Chinese labor system comes with a party-owned trade union that does not effectively ad-
vocate for workers’ rights (Hofman et al., 2017).  
"Actually, the local government asked us to have a workers’ union. So, we do have one, but 
they don't really do anything – I mean, not like a real workers’ union (…) – I think 95 % of the 
new workers are not familiar with the workers’ union. It's not popular in China, especially for 
private factories. It doesn't work, I think" (Manufacturer1). 
In combination with the Chinese education system, which does not encourage critical thinking 
but encourages to reach goals through hard work (Hofman et al., 2017), this prevents workers 
from raising their voice in order to demand higher wages (and thus put pressure on firms). 
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Rather, workers focus on earning the money they need through volunteering to do excessive 
overtime:  
"Wages are always linked to the problem of overtime. Many people complain that the workers 
in China work excessively, because they volunteer (to do overtime), because they want to earn 
more, in order to have a shorter working life, and then go back to their hometowns and build 
their houses" (BSCI3). 
 
Hence, Chinese companies are not much confronted with the two opposite poles of the paradox 
by their workers in the first place (only by their clients at the other side of the value chain), 
which makes it easier to repress the underlying tension. 
The Chinese cultural system comes with norms and values that lead to low trust in authorities 
and therefore a certain willingness to accept corruption as a given (Whitley, 1999). Manufac-
turer1 quite openly talked about making payments to workers, so they do not reveal grievances 
to the government: 
"When the government comes to your factory, they will point out a lot additional problems (…) 
like safety or pollution issues or something like this. And then you need to pay them more and 
more. So, that's not a good idea. That's why we rather pay the workers (additional payments 
they requested) and keep our heads down" (Manufacturer1). 
 
In combination with the conditions enabled by the other three subsystems of the Chinese NBS, 
this willingness to enter into corruption reinforced the defensive paradox response, especially 
splitting between expected living wage requirements on paper and lowering actually paid wages 
in practice in order to optimize financial performance. 
Differing interpretations of BSCI audits as a paradox management practice  
So far, our findings have discussed the conditions created by the German and Chinese NBS for 
firms to make sense of and handle paradoxical tensions. In this section, we point to the specific 
practice the firms applied in order to manage the living wage paradox in our empirical context 
and how it was interpreted. The paradox led to the emergence of one particular paradox man-
agement practice along the value chain: living wage audits as part of the BSCI (BSCI1, 2, 3). 
The BSCI audit system was an established part of the global value chain. However, the partic-
ular part of the BSCI audits asking for living wage data was only added in 2015 due to pressure 
by BSCI member companies (BSCI1). At the time of our study, auditors could, but did not have 
to, inquire about living wages during audits (BSCI1). Living wage audits were therefore not 
incorporated into all BSCI audits along our global value chain. However, factories did not know 
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beforehand, if they had to deliver living wage data during an audit or not. Hence, they had to at 
least prepare relevant data in case auditors would inquire about living wages. 
The BSCI living wage audits were not per se a proactive or defensive way of paradox manage-
ment; it depended on how organizations interpreted the BSCI against the context of their NBS. 
Organizations in the German NBS interpreted the audits in a proactive manner. Both Retail 
Group and Shoe Import accepted that living wage payment should be a precondition for busi-
ness conduct and should therefore be part of the BSCI. Their aim was to adjust the two con-
flicting goals by accepting them as equally important and mutually dependent. Both Retail 
Group and Shoe Import encouraged the BSCI to make the living wage a mandatory element of 
all audits (RetailGroup1_I1; ShoeImport1_I1): 
“I believe, if the BSCI takes the role to make the topic more present, to broach the issue in every 
audit, in every findings report, this is a good starting point for developing a solution together. 
Therefore, in my opinion, (the BSCI plays) a very central role (to the living wage issue). (…) In 
order to create awareness for the topic and a homogenous understanding (of living wages) in 
the entire industry, the BSCI is essential” (Retail Group1_I1). 
Chinese firms interpreted the audits in a defensive way that helped them to suppress the paradox. 
They split the paradox by having the input for their BSCI audits on wages and working hours 
forged by an external consultant (ShoeImport1_1; ShoeImport2_2) in order to continue “busi-
ness as usual” and meet their economic goals. For instance, a representative from Shoe Import 
said: "The issue is that almost no factories have attendance records, but have them faked once 
a year by consultants for the BSCI audits" (ShoeImport1_I1). Even though the living wage issue 
could have been part of audits, the Chinese organizations favored financial performance, while 
social justice was only given consideration “on paper”: 
"The Chinese way to handle such audits – one realizes you cannot find firms you can rely on. 
(…) Factories sometimes have 5 or 6 different document versions, because a client wants doc-
uments that are a little bit honest. Then they need one version for the BSCI. Then I come and 
want completely honest documents, which means they have to record their overtime realisti-
cally. For others, they only record 2 hours per night" (ShoeImport1_I1). 
 
Although German and Chinese firms construed the BSCI living wage audits differently, the 
interpretation of the practice within each NBS spilled over: i.e. Retail Group’s proactive han-
dling was passed on to Shoe Import (in Germany), while the manufacturers’ defensive handling 
was passed on to the material suppliers (in China). The main driver of these spillovers was that 
lead firms in each NBS (the retailer in Germany and the manufacturer in China) pushed their 
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interpretation of the paradox management practices down the value chain. We refer to this spill-
over practice as “dictating standards”.  
"It has always been our endeavor to say ‘Let's put the work on many shoulders, let's involve as 
many people as possible’ (…); to activate market forces to increase pressure on the value chain 
in order for this pressure to result in stronger reactions of suppliers that feel obligated to im-
plement what we demand from them" (RetailGroup5). 
 
By dictating their expectations, Retail Group also transferred their proactive paradox manage-
ment practices to Shoe Import. They dictated the BSCI standard, because it could potentially 
address the living wage issue. Retail Group defined this standard as a precondition for suppliers 
to do business with them (RetailGroup5), and it required its import agents to become BSCI 
members and to conduct relevant audits in the factories they collaborate with: “We do BSCI 
audits because our clients require us to” (Shoe Import1). 
Dictating standards also occurred in the Chinese NBS, where manufacturers dictated their ex-
pectations to material suppliers. Material suppliers mostly conducted BSCI audits because the 
manufacturers asked them to: 
“As the boss of the factory, my first concern is that one should satisfy the customers' require-
ments. So as the customer has such a requirement, I have to take the decision to conduct this 
audit” (Material Supplier1). 
This dictating of the BSCI standard caused a spillover of defensive paradox management prac-
tices. Despite requiring material suppliers to do the audits, manufacturers did not really confront 
them with both sides of the living wage paradox. They did not require them to actually adjust 
their business practices in order to address the paradox. Manufacturers accepted that material 
suppliers forged their BSCI audit results (as they did themselves) and hence dictated a defensive 
handling of the paradox management practice. For instance, Material Supplier1 only had one 
of his production sites audited, “which was the smallest and prettiest” (ShoeImport1). In order 
to safe audit costs, the company listed three production sites under the same address, despite 
them being in different locations (ShoeImport1). Although the manufacturer knew about this 
practice, they did not demand to change this approach (ShoeImport1). Generally, the manufac-
turers accepted that material suppliers also repressed the paradoxical tensions by not conducting 
audits in a reliable manner: 
“I also talk to the material factories (…). Yeah, sometimes, you know, I explain them (…) the 
rules (…). But you know, sometimes (…) they want to save the cost, and also give the cheaper 
price” (Manufacturer5). 
20 
 
 
Overall, the BSCI practice was framed very differently along the global value chain. While the 
BSCI was “officially” established in all organizations along the value chain, the way it was 
applied to the living wage paradox differed between the two NBS. The German organizations 
managed to pass on the audit standard to the Chinese organizations, but not the way it was 
framed vis-à-vis the underlying living wage paradox. The Chinese manufacturers passed on 
defensive paradox handling to the material suppliers and thereby further suppressed the para-
dox. By suppressing the paradox, BSCI audits turned into a largely ineffective tool to secure 
workers’ living wages. As one CSR manager of Shoe Import said: 
"The (BSCI) team in Brussels is super good, really good people. The foundation (of the BSCI) 
is good and the auditor trainings are also good. Yet, it completely collapses along the value 
chain and this is really sad” (ShoeImport1_I1). 
DISCUSSION 
A sensemaking model of inter-organizational responses to paradox 
Our study has explored how German and Chinese companies have coped with the living wage 
paradox along a global value chain. What is interesting is that the BSCI audit scheme was per-
ceived as a proactive tool to handle paradox in the German NBS and as a defensive way to cope 
with paradox in the Chinese NBS. German companies did not manage to dictate proactive par-
adox management to the entire value chain, because a change in interpretation of the paradox 
management practice occurred while the BSCI moved from one NBS to another. How can we 
explain this result?  
We draw together our findings in a sensemaking model of inter-organizational responses to 
paradox. The model theorizes the relationship between NBS, sensemaking activities, and the 
spillover of paradox management practices in the context of our case study. We believe that a 
focus on sensemaking is important to explain our findings, as the living wage paradox and the 
related paradox management practice exposed actors in both NBS to an ambiguous and confus-
ing situation in which they looked for a more orderly understanding (Weick, 1979). A paradox, 
therefore, reflects a “cue” – i.e. a confusing experience that people need to make sense of 
(Weick, 1995, p. 110) – which organizations need to respond to by mobilizing interpretation 
schemata (“frames” (Weick, 1995, p. 110)), which are, among other things, influenced by the 
NBS that the organization operates in. New meaning is created, if actors mobilize frames from 
their existing knowledge to make sense of cues.  
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Our model (see figure 4) distinguishes between the German and Chinese NBS. Within each 
NBS, there is a spillover of the proactive (Germany) or defensive (China) interpretation of the 
paradox management practice. In the German NBS, this spillover effect occurred because the 
positioning of the BSCI audit scheme vis-à-vis the living wage issue triggered sensemaking 
processes within Retail Group and Shoe Import, which, in turn, enabled the enactment of a 
shared organizational reality. The German companies combined relevant cues with frames that 
were influenced by the NBS they were operating in. However, as the BSCI moved down the 
value chain, it turned from a solution to the living wage paradox into a practice whose effects 
were suppressed through corruption and the forging of audit results. In other words, while 
sensemaking activities helped German firms to see the BSCI as a proactive paradox response, 
the Chinese institutional context impeded such active sensemaking activities but rather encour-
aged firms to accept the status quo (i.e. that living wages contradict financial performance) and 
continue routinized behavior (i.e. aiming for the lowest unit price). 
======================= 
Insert figure 4 about here 
======================= 
 
The question, then, is: Which factors impeded sensemaking activities by the Chinese organiza-
tions? We suggest three factors in particular: (1) differences in the experience of discrepancies 
between expectations and existing organizational reality, (2) the normalization of deviant be-
havior, and (3) a lack of response to leaders’ sensegiving activities. These three factors emerged 
once we contrasted our results with insights from relevant parts of the sensemaking literature 
(e.g., Dunbar & Garud, 2009; Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991; Weick, 1995) in order to arrive at a 
theoretical explanation for why responses to paradox management practices differed across 
NBS. Our model views the NBS as the institutional context that provides the repertoire of 
frames through which organizations assess sensemaking cues (see also Maitlis & Sonenshein, 
2010).  
Differences in the experience of discrepancies. Sensemaking processes are often triggered by 
discrepancies between expectations (in our case related to living wage implementation) and the 
existing organizational reality (Weick, 1979). The experience of such a discrepancy is subjec-
tive (Maitlis & Christianson, 2014). However, how significant the experience of this discrep-
ancy is depends, among other things, on the institutional context provided by the NBS (Cerulo, 
2006). The NBS offers a frame repertoire, which actors can draw upon to interpret the existing 
discrepancy. In our case, the German managers experienced the discrepancy between actual 
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paid wages and living wages as high, which called for sensemaking efforts on their side. The 
managers knew that the different components of their NBS called for a resolution of the living 
wage paradox (e.g., because of pressure by government-led initiatives). Hence, the retailer and 
importer mobilized interpretative schemata, which framed BSCI audits as inevitable and im-
portant. By contrast, the Chinese managers accepted that the paradox management practice only 
existed “on paper”, because the malfunctioning Chinese legal system as well as the weak role 
of unions did not create high enough expectations vis-à-vis the living wage issue. Although the 
discrepancy between paid and living wages also existed in the Chinese context, it was not ex-
perienced as a problem that needed to be addressed. As Weick (1995, p. 91) writes: “People 
have to experience the discrepancy and recognize it as such. The mere presence of a discrepancy 
is not sufficient.”  
The discrepancy between expectations and reality can be further enhanced by the experience of 
crises situations (Hoffman & Ocasio, 2001; Weick, 1995), which challenge existing interpreta-
tive schemata. In our case, the German retailer and importer knew that the industry image was 
challenged by various non-routine environmental events (e.g., the Rana Plaza incident in the 
textile industry as well as forced labor issues in Chinese textile and footwear factories), which 
called existing interpretative schemata into question. Due to the strong role of NGOs and unions 
in the German NBS, such non-routine incidents were widely discussed and hence put additional 
pressure on companies to come up with adequate responses. The proactive framing of the BSCI 
was therefore not perceived as a threat, but as a welcome way to publicly respond to crises 
situations and to manage reputational risk. In the Chinese NBS, such incidents were not part of 
the public discourse and were largely censored by the media (Witt & Redding, 2014). 
Normalization of deviance. Sensemaking activities can be impeded by what Vaughan (1996) 
has called the normalization of deviance (also Maitlis & Christianson, 2014). Such normaliza-
tion occurs whenever actors do not realize anomalies as events that could trigger sensemaking. 
Rather, they see such anomalies as something to be expected. For instance, if paradox manage-
ment practices are hindered by corruption (like in our case), and when corruption is seen as 
“normal” and is therefore expected by actors, relevant sensemaking processes around the para-
dox management practice are blocked. Hence, what appears to be normal and acceptable to 
insiders (i.e. those, who are familiar with a certain NBS) is often seen as deviant action by 
outsiders. In our case, the Chinese NBS was characterized, among other thing, by a lack of law 
enforcement and high levels of corruption (see above), both of which were experienced as nor-
mal conditions by organizations and hence hampered sensemaking practices that could have 
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framed the BSCI as a proactive paradox response. By contrast, the German managers, with their 
high trust in public institutions, saw practices like corruption as an unacceptable anomaly that 
needed to be proactively addressed. 
Lack of response to sensegiving activities. Sensemaking in the Chinese context was further 
impeded by a lack of response to sensegiving activities coming from the German organizations. 
Sensegiving refers to attempts to “influence the sensemaking and meaning construction of oth-
ers toward a preferred redefinition of organizational reality” (Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991, 
p. 442). Managers in the German business system actively tried to convince themselves, their 
stakeholders, as well as the Chinese manufacturers that BSCI living wage audits were inevitable 
and important; they used the BSCI to redefine interpretative frames that acted as the ground for 
evaluating the paradox (e.g., the need to allow for living wage audits to respond to public pres-
sure). This sensegiving framed the BSCI as a solution, and this framing was important when 
evaluating how to best address the paradox. By contrast, leaders in the Chinese firms either 
completely ignored or marginalized relevant sensegiving attempts by the German managers. 
Chinese managers had their own interpretations of the paradox and hence resisted to view the 
BSCI as a proactive solution. As Sonenshein (2010) observed, sensegiving is not a top-down 
process: Those, who receive sensegiving attempts often stick to their own interpretations and 
thus oppose alternative framings.  
Theoretical Contributions 
Our paper makes two key contributions to the literature: First, we contribute to the paradox 
literature by analyzing how an inter-organizational paradox is handled along a global value 
chain and how the institutional context of different countries influences organizational re-
sponses to paradoxical demands. We extend the recent literature that discusses how the larger 
organizational environment affects firms’ responses to paradoxical tensions (Jarzabkowski et 
al., 2013; Keller et al., 2017; Knight & Paroutis, 2017). While this literature has highlighted 
how national culture influences paradox management (Prashantham & Eranova, 2018), we put 
a stronger focus on the role of NBS and thereby emphasize how historically-grown features 
such as political and financial systems impact firms’ responses to paradox. Contrary to prior 
research (Xiao et al., 2019), we did not find Western firms being able to moderate the paradox-
ical tensions in a way that they became bearable for Chinese businesses. Rather, our study 
showed that Chinese firms interpreted a suggested paradox management practice in defensive 
ways. This framing was influenced by differences in how firms from each NBS engaged in 
sensemaking processes, mostly affected by (1) how they experienced discrepancies between 
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expectations and reality, (2) whether practices, like corruption, were perceived as normal, and 
(3) whether relevant sensegiving attempts were considered as relevant in the given institutional 
context. We caution that our results should in no way be treated as generalizable.  
Second, we contribute to the literature discussing paradoxes in the context of CSR. Prior work 
has emphasized that inter-organizational CSR paradoxes, such as between social justice and 
financial performance, demand collaborative solutions (Stadtler, 2018; Stadtler & van Wassen-
hove, 2016). While our study does not call into question the general relevance of collaborative 
solutions, it shows that their success depends on creating shared sensemaking processes across 
organizations that are exposed to different frames originating from their respective NBS. We 
thereby show that future discussions around paradoxical tensions within the CSR field need to 
consider more seriously the literature on “CSR sensemaking” (Basu & Palazzo, 2008). Collab-
orative solutions to CSR paradoxes require exploratory sensemaking processes among different 
stakeholders in which the meaning of paradox management practices is jointly enacted. Such 
an understanding puts less emphasis on the mere availability and dissemination of relevant 
practices (e.g., auditing schemes). Instead, it highlights that paradox management is influenced 
by organizationally embedded cognitive and linguistic processes that need to be shared among 
firms operating within different NBS.  
We believe that this insight is particularly useful when studying CSR paradoxes along global 
value chains (which, to our knowledge, has rarely been done; see e.g. Xiao et al., 2019 for a 
recent exception). Focusing on joint sensemaking processes along global value chains therefore 
implies that auditing schemes like the BSCI need to be embedded into collaborative manage-
ment practices that provide “occasions” (Weick, 1995) for inter-organizational sensemaking. 
Practically speaking, such occasions can be found in different contexts. Compliance-focused 
“snapshot” auditing processes, like currently undertaken through the BSCI, need to include 
more participatory elements. For instance, involving buyer firms into training sessions for sup-
pliers would help all involved parties to better understand why proactive paradox management 
ideas often collapse along global value chains. 
CONCLUSION 
Our paper has shown how organizations along a global value chain addressed the living wage 
paradox. We demonstrated that all stakeholders along the value chain applied the same paradox 
management practice: the BSCI living wage audits. However, this practice was interpreted in 
different ways in Germany and China depending on the conditions for paradox management 
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that were influenced by the respective NBS. While the German retailer could dictate its proac-
tive interpretation of the BSCI practice to the importer, this interpretation was not passed on 
from the importer to the Chinese manufacturers. Instead, the Chinese manufacturers framed the 
practice in a defensive way, and then dictated this interpretation to their material suppliers. We 
explained these results by suggesting that German organizations’ proactive framing was trig-
gered by sensemaking activities around the living wage paradox that were influenced by the 
repertoire of interpretative schemata related to the respective NBS, while these activities were 
impeded in the Chinese context.  
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TABLES AND FIGURES 
 
 
German NBS Chinese NBS 
Political  
system 
- Social market economy with 
moderate state power (Matten & 
Moon, 2008) 
- State interferes through regulation 
of, e.g., national insurance sys-
tems for health, unemployment, 
maternity, and pension (Matten & 
Moon, 2008) 
- Authoritarian capitalism with pow-
erful Communist Party of China 
(CPC) (Witt & Redding, 2013) 
- Large number of companies are 
party-owned (Hofman, Moon, & 
Wu, 2017) 
- State itself “acts as a capitalist” 
(Lin, 2010: 64) 
Financial 
system 
- Steered by a number of large in-
vestors, who in addition to the 
stock market finance the larger 
part of German corporations 
(Matten & Moon, 2008) 
- For firms that are party-owned, 
state-owned banks offer financial 
resources (Witt & Redding, 2014) 
- For privately-owned companies, fi-
nancial access is a lot harder to ob-
tain as they do not have access to 
official bank loans (Hofman et al., 
2017; Witt & Redding, 2014) 
Skill devel-
opment and 
labor system 
- Strong public education with 
qualitative public schools and 
universities complemented by a 
dual apprenticeship system, 
where both industry and state are 
responsible for producing human 
resources and developing their 
skills (Lane, 1997) 
- Strong national trade unions, 
which conduct centralized collec-
tive bargaining for wages and 
working conditions of with na-
tional employers’ associations 
(Lane, 1997), strong civil society 
 
 
- Relatively weak education system, 
despite it advances in recent years 
(Witt & Redding, 2014), that does 
not encourage critical thinking, but 
focuses on hard work (Hofman et 
al., 2017) 
- Shortage of usable skill and high 
employee turnover (Witt & Red-
ding, 2014) 
- Party-owned trade union (All-Chi-
nese Federation of Trade Unions), 
which does not represent worker 
rights, but interests of CPC (Hof-
man et al., 2017) 
Cultural 
system 
- High trust in public institutions 
and authorities (Lane, 1997) 
- Norms and values related to 
strong work and business ethics 
(Lane, 1997) 
- Low trust in authorities, triggered 
by history of the Cultural Revolu-
tion, leads to low compliance with 
legal regulation and institutional-
ized corruption (Whitley, 1999: 52) 
- Norms and values lead to positive 
attitude towards work (Witt & Red-
ding, 2014)  
 
Table 1: The German and Chinese NBS (own table). 
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Table 2: Overview of the data (own table). 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Overview of interview partners (formal and informal interviews) (own table). 
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Second-order themes First-order codes and representative data 
Conditions favoring proactive paradox response in the German NBS 
Political system encourages 
voluntary regulation  
State interference and commitment to CSR leads to voluntary regulation of wages in global 
value chains 
"If only in the context of the German Textile Alliance, but there it was decided that this year one 
mandatory initiative in the area (of living wages is demanded) and I believe for this reason now 
everyone is waiting what kind of objectives the firms are setting themselves" (Retail Group1_I1). 
Financial system and ethics 
reinforce each other  
Organizations see ethical business conduct as competitive advantage on the financial mar-
ket 
"We want to become the ethically impeccable alternative to Amazon" (RetailGroup_CEO at 
2018 press conference for the annual financial statement). 
Skill development and labor 
system confronts organiza-
tions 
  
Strong civil society and trade unions lead to pressure on organizations to prioritize living 
wage implementation 
"So and then naturally came this learning process, which was fueled by forces of civil society. 
We actually got some kind of, let me say, shit storm as one would say today, back then it was a 
negative report in "Kontraste" (German TV program)" (RetailGroup5). 
"It (the working group in the German Textile Alliance) was called living wages and is now 
called social standards and living wages (…) and was founded by NGOs" (RetailGroup1). 
Cultural system fosters ethi-
cal business  
Norms and values lead to strong trust in authorities, respect for law and its enforcement, 
and willingness to conduct ethical business 
"This is legally binding (the minimum wage legislation). I cannot stand, if legal things are not 
complied with 100%" (Retail Group1_I14). 
"(…) to place this strategic topic on the agenda and then to implement, yes, it is a challenge to 
set it on the agenda and then to implement it in accordance with my own standards" (Re-
tailGroup1_I1). 
Conditions favoring defensive paradox response in the Chinese NBS 
Political system fosters cor-
ruption  
Corruption of political system leads to no enforcement of regulation regarding wages  
"But they still (despite the legislation saying otherwise) have -- like let's say one month, two-day 
rest, means they should work 29 days or 28 days (...). And each day, they have for three hours 
overtime. I mean, eight hours plus three hours. This is very normal of factories in China" (Shoe-
Import2_I2). 
Out-dated regulation leads to lacking social security of migrant workers 
"This is the last status and this is, simply put, very clear it is for the government to do something, 
because it is not feasible to the majority of the migrant workers. (…) They wanted to have con-
trol and regulate people and therefore there was - you also didn't have a passport or any identi-
fication at all, as you were only allowed to stay in your province. You were not allowed to go an-
ywhere else and look for a job. This only got looser in the 90s, that the people, because they 
wanted to have that economic growth, that they were allowed to travel within China. However, 
such laws still base on this old understanding” (ShoeImport1_I2). 
Financial system aggravates 
long-term security 
Harder financial access leads to inability to prioritize non-economic and long-term goals 
"Yes, also this (overtime compensation) is an endeavor, where we have not had any success, be-
cause it is simply a too heavy financial burden for the factories, if they have to pay twice, actu-
ally twice, or three times on a Sunday. We have realized that this is something, where we 100% 
cannot change anything, overtime and it exists and it exists beyond the legal minimum" (ShoeIm-
port1_I2). 
Lack of insolvency proceedings leads to inability to take financial risks and long-term in-
vestment 
“Many factories went bankrupt. Especially for material suppliers it is hard, for PU (synthetic 
leather) and dying. They get closed down due to pollution. Closing for one month for them 
means they go bankrupt. There have been suicides by factory owners. Going bankrupt means 
losing your face” (Manufacturer1). 
Lacking trade union structure and civil society leads to lacking pressure regarding labor 
issues 
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Table 4: Second-order themes, first-order codes, and representative data (own table). 
Skill development and labor 
system does not pressure or-
ganizations   
"It is really difficult here in China in general. I don't know of any active trade union in any of 
our factories. Which however, I believe, really isn't special for bad or an indicator for worse fac-
tories in China, but because a strong trade union simply doesn't exist. The government, you 
know about that, regulated or determines and does not give room for smaller honest trade un-
ions, which could compete with them. I don't know of any" (ShoeImport1_I2). 
Skill development leads to particular attitude towards hard work and overtime 
"Overtime is the issue in China. And that is related to wages as workers choose to do overtime. 
They are not always forced to do that (work overtime) but they like to do it in order to get better 
wages" (RetailGroup6). 
Cultural system fosters will-
ingness to enter corruption  
Lacking trust in authorities leads to less security regarding the future and more willingness 
to enter corruption  
"Although now, however, if it takes place this arbitrarily, my work is harder, because people 
have gotten more scared in the last year to hand out honest information. Because this arbitrari-
ness (of the government) in case of violations has become much bigger. You don't have any guid-
ance any more to get an idea (of what is going to happen in case of violation). So that makes 
honesty or an honest and transparent relationship a lot more difficult" (ShoeImport1_I1). 
Differing interpretations of BSCI audits as a paradox management practice 
Proactive interpretation in 
the German NBS 
Living wages as mandatory element of BSCI audits 
"As I said, the topic of working hours will be a focus issue in the next year and wages, too, so 
that they are creating first documents that one can give to suppliers and factories in order to 
support them" (RetailGroup1_I1). 
Defensive interpretation in 
the Chinese NBS  
Forging of BSCI audit data 
"In every single BSCI report that I read it says that workers are payed on an hourly basis and they 
get overtime compensation and three times on weekends (…) so then I got to see the real docu-
ments. (…) In not a single factory, that I - is this the ideal condition, how it is supposed to be 
according to the good Chinese labor law" (ShoeImport1_I1). 
 
 
Dictating standards within 
NBS 
Dictating proactive paradox responses  
"Well, we do not dictate in the sense you have to do that and that, because we do not know the 
factory personally, but we agree for the supplier to deliver us an action plan, how he wants to 
solve the problem. (…) In the next step, it is either checked through a new audit and, depending 
on the result, or one trusts that they really do it that way" (RetailGroup7). 
Dictating defensive paradox responses 
“As the boss of the factory, my first concern is that one should satisfy the customers' requirements. 
So as the customer has such a requirement, I have to take the decision to conduct this audit” 
(Material Supplier1). 
Missing spillover of inter-
pretation across NBS 
BSCI system “breaks” along the value chain 
"I always say 'Now it's not BSCI documents, it's real documents' and such sentences make me sad 
of course, because I really like the BSCI as a system. I think it is through and through a good 
catalogue of values, but in China, through the entire corruption it has gone downhill" (ShoeIm-
port1_I1). 
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Figure 1: Data analysis (own figure). 
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Figure 2: Data structure (own figure). 
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Figure 3: Summary of findings (own figure). 
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Figure 4: A sensemaking model of inter-organizational responses to paradox (own figure).  
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APPENDIX 
Appendix 1: Interview guide 
- Thanks and introduction of interviewer and research project 
- Anonymity: If it is ok with you, I would like to record the interview. I am planning to use the 
data for scientific publications, however all personal information will be completely anony-
mized. The record can be deleted at all times. 
- The interview: 
o Order: Introduction of yourself and organization, your global value chain, living wages as 
problem and solutions, wrap up 
o Will last about 60 minutes, open questions, there is no strict order of questions 
Phase Guiding questions Focusing questions 
Introduction Please introduce yourself and your po-
sition at your company! 
 
 
What are everyday challenges?  
When does your job get tricky? Where 
are tensions? How do you deal with 
them? 
The global value 
chain and living 
wage issue 
Can you please describe the global 
value chain you are part of? 
How do relationships to your value 
chain partners look like? 
How do you collaborate with cli-
ents/suppliers in everyday life? What 
is difficult? How do you deal with 
that? 
When do living wages play a role in 
your job? 
 
When did you first come across the 
living wage topic?  
What was difficult in the past about 
living wages? How did you deal with 
that? 
How do you do the wage calculation 
when you do your assessments? 
How are the wages in the factories you 
work with?  
Would you say the Chinese footwear 
industry is at risk for poverty wages? 
Why? 
What is special about the Chinese 
footwear industry in comparison to 
other industries/countries? 
Solutions to  
living wage  
implementation 
What solutions do you implement for 
workers’ wages to be increased? Why?  
Which measures do you rather not 
take? Why not? 
How do you use the BSCI living wage 
audits? What is difficult? How do you 
deal with that? 
Which actors are relevant to improve 
wages? 
How do you collaborate with them? 
What is difficult? How do you deal 
with that? 
What is your role as importer to im-
prove wages? 
Which roles do the clients, suppliers, 
governments, NGOs, trade unions, 
BSCI play? 
Wrap up and out-
look 
How do you estimate the future im-
portance of the topic? 
Would you like to add/stress anything? 
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Appendix 2: Anonymization used in the data 
Anonymization Detailed description Location  
I Interviewer Germany 
Retail Group German retailer Germany 
Retail Group1 CSR manager at Retail Group Germany 
Retail Group2 CSR manager at Retail Group Germany 
Retail Group3 CSR manager at Retail Group Germany 
Retail Group4 Head of CSR department at Retail Group Germany 
Retail Group5 Head of CSR department at Retail Group Germany 
Subsidiary1 Subsidiary of Retail Group, brand Germany 
Retail Group6 Head of CSR department at Subsidiary1 Germany 
Retail Group7 CSR manager at Subsidiary1 Germany 
Retail Group8 Buyer at Subsidiary1  Germany 
Retail Group9 Buyer at Subsidiary1  Germany 
Retail Group10 Buyer at Subsidiary1  Germany 
Subsidiary2 Subsidiary of Retail Group, logistics company Germany 
Subsidiary3 Subsidiary of Retail Group, brand Germany 
Subsidiary4 Subsidiary of Retail Group, sustainability consultancy Germany 
Retail Group11 Consultant at Subsidiary4 Germany 
Shoe Import German importing firm Germany/China 
Shoe Import1 Head of CSR department at Shoe Import Germany/China 
Shoe Import2 CSR manager at Shoe Import China 
Shoe Import3 CSR manager at Shoe Import, chemicals manager Germany 
Shoe Import4 Capacity manager at Shoe Import, supplier relations Germany 
Shoe Import5 Key account manager at Shoe Import, supplier relations Germany 
Shoe Import6 Quality manager at Shoe Import, supplier relations China 
Shoe Import7 Merchandiser at Shoe Import, supplier relations China 
Shoe Import8 Key account assistant at Shoe Import, supplier relations Germany 
Shoe Import9 CSR manager at Shoe Import, chemicals manager China 
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Shoe Import10 Quality manager at Shoe Import, supplier relations China 
Shoe Import11 Key account manager at Shoe Import, supplier relations China 
Company2 Client of Shoe Import (other than Retail Group) Germany 
Company2a Client of Shoe Import (other than Retail Group) Germany 
Company2_1 CSR manager at Company2a Germany 
Company2_2 CSR manager at Company2a Germany 
Company2b Client of Shoe Import (other than Retail Group) Germany 
Company2_3 CSR manager at Company2b Germany 
Company2_4 CSR manager at Company2b Germany 
Company2c Client of Shoe Import (other than Retail Group) Austria 
Company3 Client of Shoe Import (other than Retail Group) UK 
Company4 Competitor of Retail Group, member of German Textile Alliance Germany 
Company5 Competitor of Retail Group, member of German Textile Alliance Germany 
Company5_1 CSR manager at Company 5, member of German Textile Alliance Germany 
Company5_2 CSR manager at Company 5, founder of ACT, living wage expert Germany 
Company6 Client of Shoe Import (other than Retail Group) Germany 
Gov1 Advisor at German Textile Alliance Germany 
NGO2 Advisor at NGO2, member of German Textile Alliance Germany 
NGO1 Advisor at NGO1, member of German Textile Alliance Germany 
Consultant1 Consultant at Consultancy2, living wage expert USA 
OECD1 Advisor at OECD, living wage expert Netherlands 
ILO1 Advisor at ILO, living wage expert Switzerland 
Trade union1 Advisor at IndustriALL, international trade union UK 
Business association1 Advisor at business association1 (Retail Group is a member),  
member of German Textile Alliance 
Germany 
NGO4, NGO4(GER) Advisor at NGO4, living wage expert India 
NGO5 Advisor at NGO5, member of German Textile Alliance Germany 
NGO3 Advisor at NGO3, China expert China 
MSI1 Founder at ACT, living wage expert UK 
BSCI1 Advisor at BSCI Germany 
BSCI2 Head of German office at BSCI Germany 
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BSCI3 Head of China office at BSCI China 
MSI2 Advisor at ACT, member of German Textile Alliance Germany 
Consultant2 Consultant at Consultancy1, living wage expert Germany 
Consultant3 Consultant at Consultancy1, living wage expert India 
MSI3 Advisor at ACT, living wage expert Netherlands 
Gov2 Advisor at German Textile Alliance Germany 
Gov3 Advisor at German Textile Alliance Germany 
Consultant4 Consultant at Consultancy3, living wage expert UK 
MSI4 Advisor at Fair Wear Foundation, living wage expert Netherlands 
Trade union2 Advisor at Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund, German trade union al-
liance 
Germany 
Trade union3 Advisor at Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund, German trade union al-
liance, member of German Textile Alliance 
Germany 
Business association2 Advisor at business association2 (Retail Group is a member), 
China expert 
Germany 
Material Supplier Material supplier for Manufacturers 1, 2, and 3 China 
Material Supplier1 Factory manager at Material Supplier 1 China 
Material Supplier2 Factory manager (production manager) at Material Supplier 1 China 
Material Supplier3 Human resources manager at Material Supplier1 China 
Material Supplier4 Accounting manager at Material Supplier1 China 
Worker1 Worker (line leader) at Material Supplier1 China 
Worker2 Worker at Material Supplier1 China 
Material Supplier Material supplier for Shoe Import China 
Material Supplier5 Factory manager (vice president) at Material Supplier 2 China 
Worker3 Worker at Material Supplier2 China 
Worker4 Worker at Material Supplier2 China 
Material Supplier6 Trader for Material Supplier2 China 
Material Supplier7 Trader for Material Supplier2 China 
Manufacturer Manufacturer for Shoe Import China 
Manufacturer1 Factory manager at Manufacturer1 China 
Manufacturer2 Assistant of factory manager at Manufacturer1 China 
Worker5 Worker at Manufacturer1 China 
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Worker6 Worker at Manufacturer1 China 
Manufacturer Manufacturer for Shoe Import China 
Manufacturer3 Factory manager at Manufacturer2 China 
Manufacturer4 Marketing manager at Manufacturer2 China 
Worker7 Worker at Manufacturer2 China 
Worker8 Worker at Manufacturer2 China 
Worker9 Worker at Manufacturer2 China 
Trader Trader for Manufacturer2 China 
Manufacturer5 Trader for Manufacturer2 China 
Manufacturer6 Trader for Manufacturer2 China 
Consultant5 Consultant at Subsidiary4, trainer, auditor for Retail Group China/Germany 
Consultant6 Consultant at Subsidiary4, trainer, auditor for Retail Group China 
Audit Company1 Audit company for Retail Group Germany 
Dying Factory1 Dying factory for Material Supplier1 and Manufacturer2 China 
Importer2 Competitor of Shoe Import China 
Manufacturer5 Manufacturer for Shoe Import China 
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